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Introduction 
The issues under appeal at this time entertain a significant volume of 
questionable candor of what constitutes a Mothers' inherent rights to her child 
that she bore out of wedlock. The issues that are directly described in Appellant's 
brief and any and all additional concerns represent a child custody dispute, 
namely, Ariann Lucinda Child, bom August 9, 2004. Appellant is objecting to 
the outcome of the April 2009 'Order.' Appellant has been forced to fight for her 
rights from the time the child was 4 months old, just to maintain her motherhood 
role. The following describes Appellant's cause of action. 
Issues Contained in Appellant's Brief 
In short format, the issues presented are directed as follows: 
1. Did the Trial Court error in assuming that a substantial change of circumstances 
did occur to substantiate a change of custody? 
2. Did the Trial Court error in assigning the 'best interest of the child9 be granted to 
Petitioner in consideration of all past unjust procedures, and failure to assign the 
Utah State Guidelines that are foolproof for the majority of divorcing and 
adjudicated children of parents who were never married? 
3. Did the Trial Court ignore Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and cause Respondent 
to suffer unexpected consequences without merit regarding loss of'natural' 
parental rights'? 
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4. Did the trial Court error in causing torrential dramatic impact to the child by 
influencing Petitioner to bear 4no responsibility' towards facilitating the pre-
existing relationship between the Respondent and the child considering that the 
Court noted that Petitioner could very well afford these costs? 
5. Did the Trial Court error by ineffectively applying their own decrees of which 
distributed a losing battle for Respondent for all Attorney's fees involved in this 
case from the initial 'Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody, and Related 
Matters' which has both escalated to Appellant's appeal, and provided 
momentum and has caused the impact enabling this appeal? 
Appellant offers to consolidate relating issues for a more effective reply to 
'Appellee's Brief within this 'Reply Brief.' For simplification purposes issues 2, 
3, and 4 should be combined, as described above. 
Relevant Reply Facts and Argument 
Foremost, existing in Appellee's Reply Brief lies an argument of the 
Appellants,' 'failure to follow proper briefing requirements.' (U.R. App. P. 24). 
This argument contains (6 Vi) pages of Appellee's 'Reply Brief.' The Court of 
Appeals' initial review of Appellee's objection was responded to on March 29, 
2010. The Court of Appeals decided to proceed with the Appellant's Appeal and 
deny a dismal of Appellant's Brief, from Appellee. This Court also recognized 
Appellant's impecuniosities in relation to the additional argument noted in 
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'Appellee's Brief,' pertaining to the transcripts that granted the continuance of the 
Appeal without the transcripts. These inept arguments, given the pre-existing 
responses from this Court, are moot contained within 'Appellee's Brief 
Appellant must muster all evidence and surface them to the Court for reference 
and accuracy. Therefore, under the Appellees,' 'Statement of Facts,' the 
following argumentative issues are believed to be without merit and credence, in 
accordance, to the authorities and case law provided as follows: 
1.'Child had argued that Globis had not had a stable job since the order of the decree 
since the entry of the August 2007 'Order,' and could not afford rent, e tc ' 
Stevens v. Collard, 863 P2d 534, 837 P.2d 593, ([8]), (Conclusions), (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
It is recognized that Respondent was self-employed from the first and 
foremost 'Verified Petition for Paternity, on January 19, 2005,' and again on 
'October 30, 2007.' Respondent's income was calculated at $883.00 per month, 
and Petitioner's income was calculated at $5000.00 per month in the October 
2007 'Order.' It was admitted into evidence on record of Petitioner's loans to 
Respondent for rent, etc. that resulted in a $5100.00 Judgment for Petitioner in 
the Oct. 30, 2007 'Order.' This is not a change of circumstance from the status of 
Respondent's ever fluctuating income (or debt) over a given period of time, (Ex. 
14 p.3 ]fl), as compared to Petitioner's. In question, what has been Petitioner's 
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recognizable income and debt throughout this custody battle, and is it equitable to 
only focus on the custodial parents' debt, or wealth? (Connelle v. Connelle— 
P.3d—, 2010 WL 2105190, (Ut. Ct. App. 2010). Hogge v. Hogge, 648 P.2d 
5155, 638 P.2d 624, *628, (Ut. Ct. App. 2010). Particularily, given the fact that 
Petitioner has been awarded primary physical custody since the April, 27 2009 
'Order' and there had been no prior discovery for child support in adjusting the 
custodial parent's income. (Utah Court of Appeals § 78B-12-102 (8), (9)), (Utah 
Court of Appeals § 78B-12-203 (4)(a), (5)(a-c), (7)(a, b)). 
From the first trial in 2007 that proposed child support at $509.00 per month; 
also, granted Petitioner a Judgment for $5100.00 of debt from Respondent (Ex. 3, 
'Findings of Halls' p.9 (21)), while refusing a plea for lack of arrearages for 
Respondent for the first 3 1/2 years' of the child's life with no permissions to 
pregnancy, or the (3) months, thereafter. (Ex. 7, p.8 8-17-07 Trial,' "nothing to 
respondent in arrerages")), (U.R.C.P. 54 (b), (c)(1)), (U.R.C.P. 106). Respondent 
never received a check for $509.00 as stated in the courtroom on August 17, 
2007,' or $502.00 per month as indicated in the 'Order.' (Ex. 3, Tindings-
Olsen' p.2 (7)), (Utah Court of Appeals § 78B-12-203 (5)(a), (5)(c), (7)(b), (UCA 
§30-3-3(1-3)). 
The first order of deductions to child support was presented in the October 30, 
2007 'Order' of $63.50 per month that reduced child support from $502.00, less 
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$63.50 for one half health care costs. (Ex. 3, 'Findings-Halls' p.7,8 (17)), (UCA 
§ 30-3-5 (6), (7)). Intermittently in these years to date, child support was 
deducted spontaneously by order's of automatic reductions of attorney's fees to 
be re-collected by Petitioner from the July 9, 2008 hearing (recorded date of July 
10, 2009 hearing) from the May 6, 2008 'Hearing.' (Ex. 7, 'Trial' p.14 of 22, 
"the court will allow Mr. Childs to recover $438 at $50.00 per month'), (Ex. 8 
'Order of Huegley' p.2 (3)). All of this caused a noteworthy impact on 
Respondent and permissibly caused an inconsistent amount of child support to 
which Respondent might be able to rely on to maintain stability from Moab to 
Salt Lake. These child support adjustments continued from the October 2007 
'Order' to the November 18, 2008 Hearing which finally calculated child support 
for Petitioner at $351.00 per month, even though Respondent was declared 
unemployed. Accessory information is identified in the record whereas 
Petitioner's income was reduced to $43,000 annually and Respondent's was 
adjusted to $3633.00 per month at the July 9, 2008 'Trial.' (Ex. 7 'Trial' p. 14, 
last paragraph). This inconsistency and impulsive reductions in itself had 
exasperated Respondent in her defense of and maintenance in supporting the 
progress of the move. Hill v. Hill, 841 P2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). Respondent 
had not held a position for even two months with the firm in Salt Lake City, 
whereas the Court immediately recalculated child support. Petitioner had reduced 
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his income from $60,000 in August 2007 to $43,000 in July 2008, in less than a 
year. Respondent raised her income from $883.00 to $3633.00 per month in less 
than a year. Hudema v. Carpenter 290 P.2d 49 f 1, (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). (Utah 
Court of Appeals § 78B-12-108 (1), § 78-12-203 (5)(a), (Ut. R. Evi. 37 (c)(f)). 
None of this was equitable accordingly within the existing 'Order' which stated 
child support would be re-calculated 'annually.' (Ex. 3 'Findings-Olsen' p.4 
(15)), (Ex.3 'Findings-Halls' p.6 (12)). The immediate one-sided and unfair 
unethical adjustment of child support created a severe impact on the child and 
Respondent, in less than 6 months' time. Had the trial court judge adhered to its 
initial 'Order' indicating that child support would be adjusted annually in 
February; Respondent may not have endured the continual roller coaster of 
events, thereafter. Kasmicki 468 P.2d 818, (Wyo. 1970). Doyle v. Doyle 221 
P.2d 888, (Ut. Ct. App. May 2010). 
Relocation was contemplated and written into the decree and Respondent 
maintains it is not a valid argument, in all attempts. (Ex. 3 'Findings-Olsen' p.7 
(30), (Ex.3 'Findings-Halls' p. 10 (27). For example, Respondent was not present 
in Moab, with her Child, for (3) months prior to Petitioner's filing of his 'Verified 
Petition For Paternity.' Doyle v. Doyle 306, 313, (Ut. Ct. App. 2009). (Ex.14 p.l 
f 1, last sentence), (Ex. 15 'Findings' p.3 (5), ( U.R.C.P. 4-903 (5), (5)(c), (Utah 
Supreme Court 'Memorandum' 'New Custody Evaluation Procedures'). 
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On the contrary, the most impressive change of circumstance was the change 
of custody from Joint Legal to Sole for Petitioner. It is predicated and accredited 
that a general practice for most trial court judges to allow a discretionary period 
of, minimally a year to pass, before altering an existing 'Order' in which they 
implicated. This presumes the faith and accountability of all parties involved to 
optimistically attain a 'workable' environment, based on the 'Order.' This allows 
for preservation, with respect to the trial court judge's original assessment for an 
opportunity of a prospectus outcome. (UCA § UCA 30-3-10.4 (2)(c), (3). In this 
case, (4) months passed when another hearing/trial was scheduled, and another, 
and another, and another, and another. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d at 5354, 738 
P2d 624, *627, (Ut. Ct. App. 1982). Then we arrive at the February 20, 2009 
'Trial' that casted custody to the other side of the spectrum from the parents' 
custodial parental position's throughout the child's life thus far? (Ex. 15, 
'Findings' p.9 ^[48, p.l 1 (B), (C), (D)). Becker v. Becker 649 P.2d 608, (Ut. Ct. 
App. Dec. 10, 1984), (UCA § 30-3-10 (l)(a)(ii)(iii)(iv), (2), (4)(b), (5), (UCA § 
30-3-10.3 (1), (7), (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c), (3), (5). 
It is described throughout 'Appellant's Brief that Joint Legal Custody was 
unworkable under the 'new' circumstance of the Respondent's move to Salt Lake 
City that was already written into the order. Furthuremore, it is exaggerated 
throughout all the trial court's 'Order's that Petitioner had spent up to 40% of 
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time with the child. (Ex. 15,' p.3 (9), p.4 (10-12)), (Ex. 14 p.2 f3, 'Father 
correctly notes that this move has made the generous parent-time schedule agreed 
to in August 2007 impossible to follow,' p.4 ^|2, 3rd sentence, 'Following that 
schedule, Father would be with Ariann about 40% of the time'). It was 
embellished by the court that Petitioner had participated heavily in the Child's 
life. It was also noted that Petitioner was not always available to care for the 
child and that extra discretion should be catered to him while he was away, 
similarly when Respondent moved to Salt lake City. Childs v. Childs 967 p.2d 
967 942 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998), (Ex. 3 'Findings-Olsen' p.5 (18), 'Findings-Halls' 
p.7 (14)), (UCA § 30-3-33). In both trials, Respondent stipulated to Petitioner's 
request of additional parent time for the benefit of the Father/Daughter 
relationship. (Ex. 14, p. 2, p.4, %29 last sentence), (Ex.8 'Order' p.2 (3). A 
'change in circumstances' had not occurred as much as Petitioner would like to 
have the Court believe that to be true. There is simply not one factor of 'change 
in circumstances' from Ariann's perspective, or the Mother's material life, or the 
Court's to necessitate a change of custody in the childs' (4 1/2 ) years, thus far. 
(Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d at 53-54). 
There were two significant changes that occurred when Respondent moved to 
Salt Lake City, such as the scheduling of excessive court dates and perpetual 
reductions in child support from the October 2007 'Order.' It was evident at that 
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time that Petitioner was not present in the child's life as the Court is so 
convinced. (Ex. 14, p.l f2, last sentence), (Ex.15 p.3 (5), (6)), (Ex. 3 Tindings-
Olsen' p.5 (10), p.7 (14). Regardless, Respondent stipulated to an equal amount 
of visitation for Petitioner as when Respondent had lived in Moab, and when 
Respondent moved to Salt Lake. Stevens v. Collard 837 P.2d 593, (Ut. Ct. App. 
1992). (Ex.14,' p.6 ^|1, last two sentences). It was obvious to the Court that 
Petitioner could afford all transportation costs at one particular court date. (Ex.7 
p.l 1 'Trial,"Ms. Globis is not to pay for the travel expenses,' 'Mr. Child is to pay 
for the travel expenses'). It was also obvious to the Trial Court that Petitioner 
could afford to pay Respondent's attorney fees in between court dates. (Ex.7 
Trial' p. 12 '4-29-08 Filed: Order: Re: Verified Motion for Renee Globis for 
award of Attorney fees.') However, one month later the trial court judge revoked 
the award of attorney's fees based on Respondent's 'brand new employment' and 
proffered another reduction in child support, per month, in 2008. (Ex. 8 'Order-
Huegely' p.2 (3)). This is just another inaccurate finding that is proved by the 
inconsistency as in stated in the 'Minute Entry,' Trial,' 'The court will allow Mr. 
Child's to deduct $438 at $50.00 per month.' Petitioner addressed the court with 
visitation and child support issues insistently in one years' time promoting failing 
progress and persecuted Respondent from moving from Moab. This eventually 
evolved to Petitioner's 'Order for Modification of Custody' in February 2009. 
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Hutchinson v. Hutchinson 849 P.2d 38, 41, (Ut. Ct. App. 1982), (Ex.7 p.13 '5-06-
08 Hearing'). 
If the Trial Court was correct in predictating a substantial change of 
circumstance, it is debatable whether the Trial Court made a correct assessment 
on the best interests of the child given the April 27, 2009 'Order' from Joint 
Legal Custody to Sole Custody. Dunkin v. Hinich 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Min. 
1989). Stanley v. Deborah 124 N.H. 138, 467 A.2d 249, 251, (1983). Charles v. 
Stenlik 744 A.3d 1255, 1257, (Pa. 2000), Same. (Ex. 14,' p.5 f3, sentence 1 & 
sentence 3), (Ex.7 p.14 '7-10-08 Trial') (Ex.14 p.l 112, first sentence. (UCA § 
30-3-10), (UCA § 30-3-10.7). In raising the concern that this case was not 
properly bifurcated for evaluation of the child's best interest after assessing that 
there was a substantial change in circumstances. For example, that 'Order' was 
objected to for 'Reconsideration' by Respondent's Attorney immediately. (Ex. 7 
p.20 '4-28-09 Filed: Objection to Proposed Order and findings,' '4-22-09 Filed: 
Motion for Reconsideration Re: Change of Custody and Memorandum in 
Support'). Both, Respondent's Attorney and Petitioner's Attorney failed to 
request a custody evaluation at that time or prior to that time, which would have 
been in the childs' ultimate best interest. Resulting in failure of applications of 
Utah Rules Civil Procedure and Utah Code Aannotated. In and for lacking 
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direction for the case, in accordance to Utah State Law and Constitutional 
provisions. (Ut. R. App. 33). 
Instead, this Appeal was filed. 
2. The prolific evidence contained in the record that imposes the best interest of the 
child overtly caters to Respondent's care of the child and introduces harassment 
charges. For example, there were (7) witnesses permitted to testify on behalf of 
Petitioner, and zero in support for Respondent's testimony at the February 2009 
trial. (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (5), (UCA § 30-3-10.3 (6), (UCA § 30-3-3 (2). It is 
argued that Respondent was a failure at managing money, (Ex. 7 p.3 f 1), but it 
does not argue that Respondent failed at providing adequate or unhealthy living 
circumstances for herself and the child. It was proved that Ariann was in a 
Montessori Pre-school for a period of consistently 6 months before the child was 
refused at the school for lack of one half of one months' payment because of the 
overwhelming infiltration of phone calls and letters requested of the school to 
provide Petitioner and/or Respondent with ammunition detrimental for the child 
in this case. The director of the pre-school, Irma Martinez, was not at the trial, 
nor on the witness list. Accepting testimony that was unchallengeable is a 
violation of Utah Rules of Evidence, and that was not offered for review prior to 
the trial for opposing counsel to comment or prepare. (Ex. 14 p.6, 7, 8). (U.R. 
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Evi. 43 (a), (b), 103 (a)(1), (d), 601(c)(l)(2), 602, 807(c), 902, 1002, 1003). (Ex. 
14p.3f2). 
At the February 2009 trial, the court permitted evidence that implicated 
Respondent's character by excessive questioning of material in which Respondent 
had no prior knowledge. (Ex. 18 'Exhibit List,' February 23, 2009). In addition 
to witnesses that had testimonies showing favoritism for Petitioner, there was no 
first hand contact that existed between Respondent and the witnesses for several 
months and even years prior to testifying against Respondent or for Petitioner. 
Which, in turn caused the court to rule in the April 27, 2009 'Order' that 
Respondent was 'an unreliable witness,' as convinced by estranged testimonies.' 
An excessive amount of time was spent gathering allegations for Appellee's case 
with Respondent, (U.R. Evi. 37 (c), (f), 43, 103 (a), 608, 611, 701, 806). and 
damaged the perception of the Mother's ability to pay. The child's future 
attendance at the pre-school was, then, effectively (U.R. Evi. 611) destoyed and 
complicated the effort of a successful and respectable relocation for making 
progress in life after the move to Salt Lake City. (Ex. 14 p.3 f 1 & 2). Huish v. 
Monroe 191 P.3d 1242, (Ut. Ct. App. 2008), Opinion. Fontenot v. Fontenot 714 
P.2d 1131. The consistency of the Child's visitation with Petitioner continued 
after Respondent moved to Salt Lake City. FN3 Shiugi v. Shiugi Supra. U. S. S. 
Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed.2d 18 (1976). Mathews v. Eldridge 924 U.S. 319, 333, 96. (Ex. 
14 
7 p. 14 '7-10-08 Trial'), (Ex. 14 p.4 | 2 last sentence), (Ex. 15 p.6 f 25 & 28)). 
This was not argued; this was fact; except for the additional exaggerations of 
'time' with the child. The previous 'Orders' have overwritten Petitioner's 
involvement with the child from day one, and of pregnancy. (Ex. 14 p. 10(3)), 
(Ex.15 'Findings' p. 3(5)(6), p.4 (10)(11)), (UCA § 30-3-10 (l)(a)(iii). 
It was identified in the 'Memorandum Decision' that it may not have been 
wise to have the child. The decision to have a child or to have an abortion is 
ultimately up to the Mother. The Father had made a decision to have a sexual 
relationship with Respondent for well over a year before the pregnancy. (Ex. 14 
p. 1 .f 1). Despite Petitioner's opinion of the Respondent, as a good or sufficient, 
enough Mother to decide to have a child; a child was bom. Kasmicki 468 P.2d 
818, 823, (Wyo. 1970). It is clear that the Petitioner cares for the child. It is 
recognized that Petitioner may be abusing the Respondent for having the child. 
(Ex. 15 'Findings' p.9 (45), p.l 1 (11)). There are several guidelines of the State 
of Utah to address two parents who were never married. Davis v. Davis 749 P2d 
647, 648 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). (USG § 30-3-3), (UCA § 30-3-5), (UCA § 30-3-
10). The Trial Court has elected that those guidelines do not apply in this case for 
blasphemous reasons; such as: lack of a custody evaluation or expert witnesses, 
refusal to order a parenting plan with the Petition to Modify, no order of 
counseling, no order of dispute resolution, and no mediation. (Ex. 14 p.l 1 (4), 
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12). (UCA § 30-3-10.3 (6)(7), (UCA § 30-3-10.4, (l)(c), (2(c), (3)). 
Respectively Petitioner argues that UCA § 30-3-10.4 (4) does not apply requiring 
a parenting plan for the request for modification, however, the mute point is that 
Respondent maintained full sole legal and physical custody of the child, before 
the August 2007 'Order' of Joint Legal Custody that was stipulated to by both 
parties. (Ex. 14 p.2 f 2, The parties agreed that Mother would have primary 
physical custody.' The court eventually determined that joint legal custody 
should be awarded.'), (UCA § 30-3-10(3). Resulting in Petitioner's complete 
lack of providing a Parenting Plan throughout his award of 'Verified Petition for 
Paternity'. (UCA § 30-3-10.3 (1)(7)), (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c)(iii)), (UCA § 30-
3-10.7). All of these options have been viable options for parents to work out 
their issues for the child's best interest. Instead, of a situation where a four and 
half year old girl must endure the impact of not having her Mother in her life 
anymore. (Ex. 15 'Order' p. 1 (2), p.2 (3), p.3 (8)). Petitioner is Australian, not a 
U.S. citizen, and it is the Mother's fear that her child may disappear to another 
country given the courts' permissions. (Ex. 3 'Findings-Halls' p. 11 (30)). It is a 
disturbing determination for the Trial Court to have placed this child into a 
situation where the Father has complete control over the Mother and Child 
relationship legally and physically. (Ex. 14 p.9 (4), The court recognizes that 
father could have been less critical and more supportive without abandoning his 
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responsibilities to Ariann.'). It is the Authority of the court is to observe the 
child's best interest. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51, 55, (Construing UCA § 30-3-
5). Permissibly, the trial court had had 3 I/2 year's of the Childs' life in hand, in 
making the assessment for the October 2007, 'Order' that commemorated a 'Joint 
Legal Custody' status for Respondent and Petitioner. Pusey v. Pusey 728 P.2d 
117, 120, (Ut. Ct. App. 1986). Prayzek v. Prayzek 776 P.2d 78, *82. Kramer v. 
Kramer 738 P.2d 624. (Ex. 15 'Finding' p.2 ^1), 'The parties' agreed that Mother 
would have primary physical custody and that joint legal custody should be 
awarded.'). Then, changed their' decision, less than a year later after several 
disruptive court appearances and threats of allegations to promote a 'change in 
circumstance.' (Ex. 15 'Findings' p.2, ^[1, 'The parties indicated that they had 
reached a settlement, but an order was never filed because shortly after the 
hearing, the Respondent had lost her job and her counsel refused to enter a 
judgment because the facts had changed' (1), 'The Father and Mother were joint 
parents of a child, Ariann, born in August 2004'), (Ex. 8 'O'rder' p.2 [^5), (Ex. 7 
p. 14 'Trial' p. 15 '9-29-08 Filed Notice of submission of proposed order, 4-29-08 
Filed: 'Order Re: Petitioner's Petition to Modify order'), (Ex. 14 p.5 %29 'No 
judgment based on the July 2008, stipulation was ever entered.' 'Counsel for 
Mother refused to prepare a judgment because the facts on which it was based 
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had changed.'). Explicitly, Father and Mother were, on the contrary, joint legal 
custody, of Ariann. (U.R.C.P. 52 (d), (U.R.C.P. 59 (a)(1), (3-7)). 
In consideration of the question at hand: 
a. Did the move from Salt Lake City have a significant affect upon the child and the 
Maternal relationship? Her home and her school changed, but her life with her 
Mother and Father held the same consistency, and her time with her Father. 
(UCA § 30-3-10 (a)(ii). Huish v. Munro 191 P.3d 1242, (Ut. Ct. App. 2008). 
Hudema v. Carpenter 989 P.2d 491, 497-98, (Ut. Ct. App. 1999). Larson v. 
Larson 888 P.2d 719, 722, (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). 
b. Was the child's life affected at all by the windfall, or by the loss of Respondent's 
inheritance? Respondent was in debt prior to the inheritance and before the birth 
of the child, then Respondent paid all debts with the aid of the inheritance and 
supplemented her income with dedication to be a 'stay at home Mom,' then, debt 
was accumulated, again. (Ex. 14 p.3 ^fl). Respondent was ordered to pay Greg 
Child (Petitioner/Appellee) $5100.00 for loans contained within the Oct. 30, 2007 
'Order.' (Ex. 3 'Order-Halls' p. 6 (15)), (U.R.C.P. 54 (b), (UCA § 30-3-5). 
Respondent spent a large portion of the inheritance specifically described in the 
April 27, 2009 'Order and Findings' on surviving in Moab with an unsupported 
Father. However, it is presently being overlooked that this inheritance which 
qualified a substantial change of circumstance was identified abstractly in the 
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October 30, 2007 wOrder and Findings,' as well. Hogge v. Hogge 738 P.2d, 624, 
*628. In universal references, this has no substantial value on Motherhood 
capabilities regarding the child's welfare, or 'Best Interest.' (UCA § 30-3-34). 
c. Is it in the best interest of the child to have only one overbearing parent, instead 
of two that maintain a respectful relationship, or at least try, and in some cases by 
law, forced to try by law and 4in accordance;' except in this case. (UCA § 30-3-
11.3), (UCA §30-3-12). 
d. It is recognizable in the authorities that a child's best interests are served first 
with meaningful contact with both parents. (Shiugi v. Shiugi, Supra.), (UCA § 
30-3-10), (UCA § 30-3-10.4). Credit is given to family, friends, schooling and 
community. In this case, Petitioner served minimally in the child's life, but 
extensively in the Court's Life of this Child, thus far; with the Respondent as 
primary caretaker of the child. (UCA § 30-3-10 (iii)). Neither parent is from 
Moab, or has ever had relatives in Moab, so that is not a consideration. Hudema 
v. Carpenter, 290, (Ut. Ct. App. 1999). (Ex.14 p.l %2), Contradicting, (Ex. 15 p.2 
(3), p.3 (5)(6)). The final factor of schooling, community, and financial 
opportunity should be recognized as a very mature choice for Respondent to have 
moved to Salt Lake City in effort to give the child expanded educational 
opportunities approaching the age of five years old, and a more convenient access 
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to her family in Chicago, by and through her Mother, (Respondent). (Fontenot v. 
Fontenot 714 P.2d 1131). 
e. It is recognized by the court that the Respondent had several places to live and 
several jobs, and that this was not in the child's best interest. The best interest of 
the child could have been protected for the Respondent and the child had the trial 
court relieved the Respondent of even a few Court dates and offered a time period 
for stability to get established. A move for any family is difficult enough given 
the economic and emotional stresses' enduring among our society. As the Trial 
Court lodged the ambush of Court appearances and litigation for Respondent in 
support of Petitioner's unethical and immoral allegations denying Respondent of 
an opportunity to make better her situation to Salt Lake City financially, it is 
prevelant that this instability caused by Petitioner's actions and the Court's 
'Orders,' resulted in unlawful determinations that were not to the benefit of the 
Child. (UCA § 30-3-12), (UCA § 30-3-32). 
f. Was it to the child's benefit to have on-going reductions in child support in this 
case to an amount of $351.00 per month, from $502.00 per month, as indicated in 
the 'Record,' with the references provided in 'Appellant's Brief (Utah Court of 
Appeals §78B-12-108,(1)). 
All of these points of the child's best interest truly rely on which parent is 
most likely to be good, honest, hard-working, ethical, positive, dedicative, 
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supportive, and loving. Appellant believes a good evaluation of the child's best 
interest concerning the Respondent's charges (allegations) are dispositive with 
her attempts to approach a better life for both Respondent and Child. 
Concludingly, they are conducive in showing that Petitioner evaded his respective 
responsibilities to the Mother/Daughter relationship. These aspirations of a 
promising home for Mother and Child in Salt Lake, and extended time with her 
Father in Moab were abandoned due to the change of custody. 
With all due respect, this child, this case would not exist had Respondent 
decided to have an abortion. Petitioner is noted as not approving and/or wanting 
the Child in formative years.' However, in itself, these are formative years right 
now that Respondent is crying out for the permissions to participate in the Child's 
life. (Ex. 14 p. 10 (4)). By law, the Mother is not required to provide a parenting 
plan in her decision to have a child. The law should not recognize the wants of 
the parents, but the necessities of the Child to have both parents' equitably 
involved, as was, supported in the 'Order' of October, 2007; though, it was never 
enforced. (UCA § 30-3-35). 
Respondent did not give up her parental rights, or abuse them. 
This case is an extreme cry for Mother's to fear. The decision a Mother holds 
to have a child and be granted the opportunity to the right to exist and be relevant 
in that child's life has become an absolute struggle beyond justifiable reasoning. 
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Regardless of how many jobs the Mother has retained, or places she has lived in 
and throughout the child's life. This decision for Respondent to have the baby 
may seem morose to the Father. However, Mothers are Mothers because they 
chose to have a child and endure all consequences at best, and under unforeseen 
circumstances.' The essence of this type of assumption of'instability' is in itself 
oppressive to administer to a single Mother, and release custody to a father that 
promoted it. (Exhibit 15, 'Findings' p.3 (7), (Ex.14 p.9 (4), 'Mother was clearly 
not comfortable of father's monitoring of her activities in Moab.'). Respondent 
prays that the best interest of this child will be served considering the Respondent 
has pursued a better quality of life, and a more positive outlook for the child to 
have for her future. Kramer v. Kramer 738 P.2d 624. It is clear that Respondent 
bore the child with every intention and sacrifice of providing, nurturing, caring, 
loving, the child to the best of capabilities, consistently apprising the Father of a 
an opportunity to be involved, and always trying to correct the inadequacies of 
not being a perfect human being. As a race, we strive for this perfection, but if 
we did not endure the imperfections of our parents, how would we ever learn to 
grow better and surpass those imperfections, as children. 
3. The Respondent's request for Attorney's fees is applicable in this case given the 
disproportionate amount of legal fees involved in comparison to the Respondent's 
loss of income, assets, and inheritance, and the Petitioner's deep pockets, given 
22 
his ability to afford all the attorney expenses while reducing his income from over 
$60,000 a year to $40,000 in 2008 and 2009, regarding the last reduction in child 
support. Childs v. Childs 967 P.2d 942, 945, Cert Denied, 982 P.2d 88, (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1998). (UCA § 30-3-10 (4)(a)), (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (5)), (Utah Court of 
Appeals § 78B-12-203 (4)(a), (5)(b), (7)(b)). In both instances, the Trial Court 
failed to recognize that this loss of income and inheritance was impressionably 
due to the failure of support from Petitioner. It is apparent that Respondent made 
all attempts given a great amount of liberty and effort to provide a stable home for 
the child in Moab, for Petitioner's access; but, foremost, provisions were gifted to 
Petitioner from Respondent for the Child. In referencing, Respondent agreed to 
petitioner's visitation requests, as well as, selling Respondent's land to pay 
attorney's and Petitioner $5100.00. When the Respondent decided to move from 
Moab the Court frowned upon that move, for the sole reason of Petitioner's 
allegations that led exhaustible court dates to kill the effort. Respondent did not 
get legitimate support from the Petitioner in Moab or Salt Lake City. The child 
did not lose visitation or her routine with either parent in Moab or Salt Lake, 
under Respondent's care. This point is important because it recognizes that the 
Respondent was not abusing court orders or failing at providing for the child in 
any form quantative for the trial court to persist with court appearances. Hogge v. 
Hogge 649 P.2d at 53-54, (Ut. Ct. App. 1982). (Ex. 14 p. 10 (1)). The Trial Court 
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issued a very distinct order that would consider awarding attorney fees for the 
prevailing party in disputes. (Utah Court of Appeals § 78A-12-103 (2)(c), (Supp. 
2009), (Conclusion). Thus far, Respondent had prevailed at times, and the Court 
did not support their'October 30, 2007; 'Order and Findings.' Connell v. 
Connell—P.3d—, 2010 WL 2105190, (Ut Ct. App., 2010), (Utah Court of 
Appeals § 78B-12-102(7), (Supp.2009), Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, (Ut. Ct. App. 
1992), Doyle v. Doyle 221 P.2d 888 (UtCt. App. May 2010). (UCA § 30-3-3). 
(Ex. 7 'Trial' p. 14 'Respondent asks for her attorney's fees.'), (Ut. R. App. 30), 
(Ut. R. App. 33). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, hereby, respects and requests the Court of Appeals to reconsider 
the trial courts' determination in favor of Appellant for all the considerations 
unjust presented. The parental bond and nature of the child's relationship with 
her Mother has suffered emotional, psychological, physical and financial 
destruction through legal berating causing severe financial impacts that have 
inhibited the on-going healthy relationship that Respondent had maintained with 
the child. Ariann should not be a ping-pong in her parents' struggle with the 
distribution of parental rights.' Stability is first recognized with the parent who 
outweighs the bond with the child. The trial court failed to make an assertion 
which parent the child has spent the most time or better suited in maturity by 
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offering no expert witnesses, instead contradictory findings. Presumably the goal 
for the child's best interest to be recognized by factual findings contained within 
the record, it should be obvious to the court that Ariann has spent the majority of 
her life with her Mother. The factual basis of Ariann's relationship with her 
Mother had not changed from August 2007 to February 2009. Respondent's 
financial condition changed somewhat, Respondent's home changed, and 
Respondent's relationship in parenting with the Petitioner worsened. The avenue 
that the court directed for Petitioner and Respondent by disallowing negotiation 
of their differences about the move to Salt Lake have encouraged a shocking 
outcome for the child to be abandoned by her Mother. 
Appellant, hereby, prays the Court of Appeals to adhere to the failures of 
justice described within this case for the sake of the Mother/Daughter relationship 
and the child's best interest. In addition, in preserving the strength of the State of 
Utah Rules and Regulations for a Mother to have and maintain equal rights' to 
her child with a paternal Father, albeit the imbalance of power contained within 
this case. Appellant requests the following resolutions for posturing the 5 year 
old child to have a future of maintaining the security of both parents participating 
heavily in her life. 
1. Primary physical custody to be returned to Respondent. Joint legal custody to be 
re-instated. 
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2. Mediation (dispute resolution), counseling, and a parenting plan to be ordered to 
negotiate parent time, child support, and other relevant issues. 
3. Appellant's attorney fees to be awarded for the dishonor of the failure of 
appropriate and fair justifications in this case, and for the suffering that Appellant 
has had to endure in result. 
Dated this 10th day of August 2010 
RenWCjlobis^Pro Se Annellalft 
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Utah Judicial Code § 78A-12-103 (2)(c) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(c) appeals from juvenile courts. 
Utah Judicial Code § 78B-12-102 (8), (9) 
(8) "Child support" means a base child support award, or a monthly financial award for uninsured 
medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for the support of a child, including current periodic payments, 
all arrearages which accrue under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments 
awarded for arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs. 
(9) "Child support order" or "support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a tribunal whether 
interlocutory or final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a 
proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, paternity, guardianship, civil 
protection, or otherwise which: 
(a) establishes or modifies child support; 
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or 
Utah Judicial Code § 78B-12-108 (1), (B) 
(1) Obligations ordered for child support and medical expenses are for the use and benefit of the child 
and shall follow the child. 
Utah Judicial Code § 78B-12-203 (4)(a), (5)(a-c), (7)(a)(b) 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting 
necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income 
and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an 
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those 
expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated 
to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay 
stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year 
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unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records 
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer 
statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or 
overemployment situation exists. 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the 
parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the 
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for 
the imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and 
probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for 
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Ut. R. App. 30 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or 
judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial 
court or agency to supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the issues 
presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial court or agency to enter 
judgment in accordance with the findings as revised. The court may also order a new trial or further 
proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all 
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final 
determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the 
judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, 
modified, or affirmed, the reasons shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice 
or judge concurring or dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the clerk. 
The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the entry of the judgment of the court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes that a case satisfies the criteria 
set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the case by order without written opinion. The decision shall 
have only such effect as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk shall give notice to the 
respective parties and make the decision public in accordance with the direction of the court. 
(f) Citation of decisions. Published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and 
unpublished decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1,1998, may be cited as 
precedent in all courts of the State. Other unpublished decisions may also be cited, so long as all parties 
and the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time all such decisions are first cited. 
Ut. R. App. 33 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if 
the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or 
for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in 
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Rule 34. and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the 
damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing 
the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. (1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own 
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for 
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response 
to a motion or other paper. (2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages 
should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the 
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered 
for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. (3) If 
requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
U-R.C.P. 4-903 (5), (5)(C) 
(5) The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with information it can use to 
make decisions regarding custody and parenting time arrangements that are in the child's best interest. 
When one of the prospective custodians resides outside of the jurisdiction of the court, two individual 
evaluators may be appointed. In cases in which two evaluators are appointed, the court will designate a 
primary evaluator. The evaluators must confer prior to the commencement of the evaluation to 
establish appropriate guidelines and criteria for the evaluation and shall submit only one joint report to 
the court. 
(5)(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; 
U.R.C.P. 37 (c), (f) 
U.R.C.P. 52 (d) 
(d) Correction of the Record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the transcript of an 
audio or video record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to whether the record 
accurately discloses what occurred in the proceeding, a party may move to correct6 the record. The 
motion must be filed within ten days after the transcript of the hearing is filed, unless good cause is 
shown. The omission, misstatement, or disagreement shall be resolved by the court and the record 
made to accurately reflect the proceeding. 
U.R.C.P. 54 (b), (c)(1) 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence 
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
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to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the 
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of 
several claimants; and it may, when the justice ot the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of 
the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
U.R.C.P. 59 (a)(1), (a)(3-7) 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial, (a)(3) Accident or 
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, (a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, 
material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial, (a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice, (a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. (a)(7) Error in law. 
UR.C.P. 106 
(a) Commencement; service; answer. Except as provided in Utah Code Section 30-3-37, 
proceedings to modify a divorce decree or other final domestic relations order shall be 
commenced by filing a petition to modify. Service of the petition, or motion under Section 30-3-
37, and summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with Rule 4. The responding 
party shall serve the answer within the time permitted by Rule 12. 
(b) Temporary orders, (b)(1) The judgment, order or decree sought to be modified remains in 
effect during the pendency of the petition. The court may make the modification retroactive to 
the date on which the petition was served. During the pendency of a petition to modify, the 
court:(b)(l)(A) may order a temporary modification of child support as part of a temporary 
modification of custody or parent-time; and(b)(l)(B) may order a temporary modification of 
custody or parent-time to address an immediate and irreparable harm or to ratify changes made 
by the parties, provided that the modification serves the best interests of the child. 
'Memorandum,' New Custody Evaluation Procedures' 
'I. Introduction 
Noting that custody evaluations are of varying quality, that high quality evaluations can be 
costly, and that waiting for evaluations stalls the legal process, the Judicial Council charged the 
Standing Committee on Children and Family Law to "improve the quality and timeliness of 
custody evaluations." Having studied the issue in depth, the Standing Committee now presents 
substantial revisions to Rule 4-903, "Custody Evaluations" of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, as well as these accompanying forms. This memo explains the process 
envisioned by the forms, and details the changes made to the rules. 
II. Contemplated Custody Evaluation Process 
Custody Evaluation forms have been approved by the Supreme Court and Judicial Council to 
reduce the need for extensive, formally-prepared evaluations, and to make custody 
considerations more accessible to the commissioner or judge on the bench. Any custody 
evaluation submitted to the court must address the topics noted on these forms. 
The settlement conference procedure is designed to (1) reduce the time and expense of 
preparing a written report in cases where this might not be needed, (2) disclose the custody 
evaluation findings in such a way that is less adversarial and less damaging to family 
relationships, and (3) allow the parties a final opportunity to participate in the fashioning of an 
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agreement. It allows the parties to benefit from the insights of the evaluator while still 
experiencing a sense of control over the decisions made about their children. Through greater 
participation of the parties, it is hoped that future conflict will be reduced. If no settlement is 
reached at or soon after this conference, a written evaluation would be prepared and a court date 
set. The "Settlement Conference Report" form sets forth the topics to be addressed at the 
settlement conference. Toward the end of the settlement conference, and depending on the 
wishes of the commissioner or judge, the evaluator may issue verbal custody recommendations/' 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
U. R. Evi. 37 (c), (f) 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of 
any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the 
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply 
to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making 
that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the 
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on 
the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by 
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that 
party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or 
in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
U. R. Evi. 43 (a), (b) 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise 
provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be 
admitted which is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear 
the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be 
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. 
U.R.Evi. 103 (a)(1), (d) 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
Objection. In case is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, 
stating the specific grounds of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
U. R. Evi. 601 (c)(1), (2) 
U. R. Evi. 602 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding tha 
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but 
need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
U. R. Evi. 608 
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(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the 
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by 
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of 
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of 
the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters 
that relate only to character for truthfulness. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the 
witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
U.R.Evi.611 
(a) Control by the court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment, (b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross 
examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and and matters affecting 
the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional 
matters as if on direct examination, (c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on 
the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony. 
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross examination. When a party calls a hostile 
witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading 
questions. 
U. R. Evi. 701 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences 
is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness 
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
U. R. Evi. 801 
(d) Statements which are not heresay. A statement is not heresay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross 
examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconcsistent with the declarants 
testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarants testimony and is offered to rebut and express or implied charge against the declarant of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) a party's own 
statement in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement in which the party has 
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or(C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning 
the matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
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relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
U. R. Evi. 806 
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801 (d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted 
in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any 
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence 
of a statement, or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay 
statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity 
to deny or explain. If a party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant 
as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross 
examination. 
U. R. Evi. 807 
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interest of justice will be best served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this 
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the 
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
U. R. Evi. 902 
(12) Certified foreign records of regularily conducted activity- In a civil case, the original or a duplicate 
of a foreign record of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if 
accompanied by an affidavit or a written declaration by its custodian or other qualified person certifying 
that: 
(D) the person certifying the records does so under penalty or making a false statement in an official 
proceeding. 
The affidavit or declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the make to 
criminal penalty under the laws where the declaration was signed. A party intending to offer a record 
into evidence under this paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, 
and must make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer 
into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge them. 
U. R. Evi. 1002 
To prove a content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph 
is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court 
of this State or by Statute. 
U. R. Evi. 1003 
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a question is raised as to the 
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of 
the original. 
Utah Code Annotated 
UCA§ 30-3-3 (1-3) 
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(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B, 
Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the 
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the 
other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the 
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees 
or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the 
reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, during the 
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any 
children in the custody of the other party. 
UCA § 30-3-5 (6), (7), (8) 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and 
denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the 
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant 
facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that 
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or 
born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the 
marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one 
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the 
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
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conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient 
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify that action. 
UCA § 30-3-10 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and custody of the minor children as it 
considers appropriate. 
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, the following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child 
frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent; 
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the 
relationship between a parent and child; and 
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2. 
(b) The court shall, in every case, consider joint custody but may award any form of custody which is 
determined to be in the best interest of the child. 
(c) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier of fact determines that 
extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the testimony of the children be heard and 
there is no other reasonable method to present their testimony. 
(d) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding 
future custody or parent-time schedules, but the expressed desires are not controlling and the court 
may determine the children's custody or parent-time otherwise. The desires of a child 16 years of age or 
older shall be given added weight, but is not the single controlling factor. 
(e) If interviews with the children are conducted by the court pursuant to Subsection (l)(d), they shall be 
conducted by the judge in camera. The prior consent of the parties may be obtained but is not necessary 
if the court finds that an interview with the children is the only method to ascertain the child's desires 
regarding custody. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, the court shall take that 
evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to the other parent. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate against a parent due to a 
disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a substantial 
change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining whether a 
substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the parent with a 
disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising from the disability by showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide for the 
physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or 
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available to 
supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the 
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child at issue. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to adoption proceedings under Title 78B, Chapter 
6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act. 
(5) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, 
joint physical custody or sole custody, but allows the court and the family the widest discretion to 
choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child. 
UCA§ 30-3-10.1 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Joint legal custody": 
(a) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, where 
specified; 
(b) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific decisions; 
(c) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the order of joint legal custody; 
(d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to the child 
to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often requires that a primary physical residence 
for the child be designated; and 
(e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the 
primary residence of the child. 
(2) "Joint physical custody": 
(a) means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents 
contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support; 
(b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to the child by each of the 
parents, as required to meet the best interest of the child; 
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be designated; and 
(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the 
primary residence of the child. 
UCA § 30-3-10.3 (1), (7) 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal custody or joint physical custody 
is entered both parties shall attend the mandatory course for divorcing parents, as provided in Section 
30-3-11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the course to the court. 
(7) An order of joint legal or physical custody shall require a parenting plan incorporating a dispute 
resolution procedure the parties agree to use before seeking enforcement or modification of the terms 
and conditions of the order of joint legal or physical custody through litigation, except in emergency 
situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c)(iii), (2-5) 
(1) On the petition of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal or physical custodians if they are not 
the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modhy or terminate an order that established joint legal or 
physical custody if: 
(c) (i) both parents have complied in good faith with the dispute resolution procedure in accordance 
with Subsection 30-3-10.3(7); or 
(ii) if no dispute resolution procedure is contained in the order that established joint legal or physical 
custody, the court orders the parents to participate in a dispute resolution procedure in accordance with 
Subsection 30-3-10.2(5) unless the parents certify that, in good faith, they have utilized a dispute 
resolution procedure to resolve their dispute. 
(2) (a) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by either modifying or 
terminating the joint legal or physical custody order, the court shall, in addition to other factors the 
court considers relevant, consider the factors outlined in Section 30-3-10 and Subsection 30-3-10.2(2). 
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(b) The court shall make specific written findings on each of the factors relied upon stating: 
(i) a material and substantial change of circumstance has occurred; and 
(ii) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order would be an improvement for and in the best 
interest of the child. 
(c) The court shall give substantial weight to the existing joint legal or physical custody order when the 
child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted. 
(3) The court shall, in every case regarding a petition for termination of a joint legal or physical custody 
order, consider reasonable alternatives to preserve the existing order in accordance with Subsection 30-
3-10(l)(b). The court may modify the terms and conditions of the existing order in accordance with 
Subsection 30-3-10(5) and may order the parents to file a parenting plan in accordance with this 
chapter. 
(4) A parent requesting a modification from sole custody to joint legal custody or joint physical custody 
or both, or any other type of shared parenting arrangement, shall file and serve a proposed parenting 
plan with the petition to modify in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8. 
(5) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner 
designed to harass the other party, the court shall assess attorney fees as costs against the offending 
party. 
UCA § 30-3-10.7 
(1) "Domestic violence" means the same as in Section 77-36-1. 
(2) "Parenting plan" means a plan for parenting a child, including allocation of parenting functions, 
which is incorporated in any final decree or decree of modification including an action for dissolution of 
marriage, annulment, legal separation, or paternity. 
(3) "Parenting functions" means those aspects of the parent-child relationship in which the parent 
makes decisions and performs functions necessary for the care and growth of the child. Parenting 
functions include: 
(a) maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child; 
(b) attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feeding, clothing, physical care, grooming, 
supervision, health care, day care, and engaging in other activities which are appropriate to the 
developmental level of the child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the 
particular family; 
(c) attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or other education essential to the 
best interest of the child; 
(d) assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate interpersonal relationships; 
(e) exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child's welfare, consistent with the child's 
developmental level and family social and economic circumstances; and 
(f) providing for the financial support of the child. 
UCA §30-3-11.3 
(1) There is established a mandatory course for divorcing parents as a pilot program in the third and 
fourth judicial districts to be administered by the Administrative Office of the Courts from July 1,1992, 
to June 30,1994. On July 1,1994, an approved course shall be implemented in all judicial districts. The 
mandatory course is designed to educate and sensitize divorcing parties to their children's needs both 
during and after the divorce process. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement and administer this program. 
(3) As a prerequisite to receiving a divorce decree, both parties are required to attend a mandatory 
course on their children's needs after filing a complaint for divorce and receiving a docket number, 
unless waived under Section 30-3-4. If that requirement is waived, the court may permit the divorce 
action to proceed. 
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(4) The court may require unmarried parents to attend this educational course when those parents are 
involved in a visitation or custody proceeding before the court. 
(5) The mandatory course shall instruct both parties: 
(a) about divorce and its impacts on: 
(i) their child or children; 
(ii) their family relationship; and 
(iii) their financial responsibilities for their child or children; and 
(b) that domestic violence has a harmful effect on children and family relationships. 
(6) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall administer the course pursuant to Title 63G, Chapter 6, 
Utah Procurement Code, through private or public contracts and organize the program in each of Utah's 
judicial districts. The contracts shall provide for the recoupment of administrative expenses through the 
costs charged to individual parties, pursuant to Subsection (8). 
(7) A certificate of completion constitutes evidence to the court of course completion by the parties. 
(8) (a) Each party shall pay the costs of the course to the independent contractor providing the course at 
the time and place of the course. A fee of $8 shal1 be collected, as part of the course fee paid by each 
participant, and deposited in the Children's Legal Defense Account, described in Section 51-9-408. 
(b) Each party who is unable to pay the costs of the course may attend the course without payment 
upon a prima facie showing of impecuniosity as evidenced by an affidavit of impecuniosity filed in the 
district court. In those situations, the independent contractor shall be reimbursed for its costs from the 
appropriation to the Administrative Office of the Courts for "Mandatory Educational Course for 
Divorcing Parents Program." Before a decree of divorce may be entered, the court shall make a final 
review and determination of impecuniosity and may order the payment of the costs if so determined. 
(9) Appropriations from the General Fund to the Administrative Office of the Courts for the "Mandatory 
Educational Course for Divorcing Parents Program" shall be used to pay the costs of an indigent parent 
who makes a showing as provided in Subsection (8)(b). 
(10) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a program to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
mandatory educational course. Progress reports shall be provided annually to the Judiciary Interim 
Committee. 
UCA § 30-3-12 
Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, 
separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and support in connection therewith, child custody in 
habeas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise the family counseling powers conferred by this 
act. 
UCA § 30-3-32 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all parties' 
interests. 
(2) (a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child and the parent who is the 
victim of domestic or family violence. 
(b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to 
the child: 
(i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to have frequent, 
meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce; 
(ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for frequent, 
meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best interests; and 
(iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in parenting the child. 
(c) An order issued by a court pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act shall be 
considered evidence of real harm or substantiated potential harm to the child. 
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(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the evening the child gets out of 
school for the Christmas or winter school break until the evening before the child returns to school. 
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other than a weekend, holiday as provided in 
Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(3) and (17), 
and "Christmas school vacation." 
(d) "Surrogate care" means care by any individual other than the parent of the child. 
(e) "Uninterrupted time" means parent-time exercised by one parent without interruption at any time 
by the presence of the other parent. 
(f) "Virtual parent-time" means parent-time facilitated by tools such as telephone, email, instant 
messaging, video conferencing, and other wired or wireless technologies over the Internet or other 
communication media to supplement in-person visits between a noncustodial parent and a child or 
between a child and the custodial parent when the child is staying with the noncustodial parent. Virtual 
parent-time is designed to supplement, not replace, in-person parent-time. 
(4) If a parent relocates because of an act of domestic violence or family violence by the other parent, 
the court shall make specific findings and orders with regards to the application of Section 30-3-37. 
UCA § 30-3-33 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the following 
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. 
(1) Parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed 
solution. 
(2) The parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the child's life. 
(3) Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family 
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and 
other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently 
conflict with the parent-time schedule. 
(4) The responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall be determined by the court 
when the parent-time order is entered, and may be changed at any time a subsequent modification is 
made to the parent-time order. 
(5) If the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial parent shall have the child 
ready for parent-time at the time the child is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home 
or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is returned. 
(6) If the custodial parent will be transporting the child, the noncustodial parent shall be at the 
appointed place at the time the noncustodial parent is to receive the child, and have the child ready to 
be picked up at the appointed time and place, or have made reasonable alternate arrangements for the 
custodial parent to pick up the child. 
(7) Regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for the exercise of parent-time by 
either parent. 
(8) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the work 
schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall 
not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5. 
(9) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the 
distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time. 
(10) Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply with 
a court-ordered parent-time schedule. 
(11) The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all 
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being 
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honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully. 
(12) The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and 
daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the 
event of a medical emergency. 
(13) Each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number, email address, 
and other virtual parent-time access information within 24 hours of any change. 
(14) Each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored 
communications with the child, in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is 
reasonably available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the 
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time 
is reasonably available, taking into consideration: 
(a) the best interests of the child; 
(b) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(c) any other factors the court considers material. 
(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court 
shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to 
transport the children, to provide the child care. Child care arrangements existing during the marriage 
are preferred as are child care arrangements with nominal or no charge. 
(16) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current 
address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders 
otherwise. 
(17) Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the 
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall 
have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
(18) If the child is on a different parent-time schedule than a sibling, based on Sections 30-3-35 and 30-
3-35.5, the parents should consider if an upward deviation for parent-time with all the minor children so 
that parent-time is uniform between school aged and nonschool aged children, is appropriate. 
UCA § 30-3-34 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a parent-time 
schedule consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided in 
Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The parent-
time schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the 
child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that 
more or less parent-time should be awarded based upon any of the following criteria: 
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional 
development; 
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's well-being during 
parent-time; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child 
during periods of parent-time; 
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections facility, or an 
adult corrections facility; 
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent; 
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(i) the involvement or lack of involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, 
religious, or other related activities of the child; 
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial parent is 
unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances; 
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled parent-time; 
(I) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship prior to the 
conception of the child; 
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings; 
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and 
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child. 
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that: 
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or 
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-
35.5. 
(4) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the schedule except 
by mutual consent of the parties or a court order. 
UCA § 30-3-35 'Minimum Schedule for Parent-Time for Childrens 5 to 18 
Years of Age.' 
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Conclusion 
Hill v.Hill, 841P.2d722(Ut. Ct.App. 1992) 
Doyle v.Doyle, 221 P.2d 888 (Ut. Ct. App. May 2010) 
Case Law 
Utah law makes clear that a determination of whether substantial and material 
changes have occurred is a fact-intensive legal determination that is presumed 
valid and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Young v. Young, 
2009 UT App 3,14, 201 P.3d 301. 
Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, 313 
f 22 Huish also argues that the trial court failed to 
address certain factors set forth in rule 4-903 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, including the duration of the initial 
physical custody arrangement and child-parent bonding, in 
determining that a change in physical custody was warranted. In 
its Finding 11, the trial court stated: "The Court has 
considered several factors, including the factors set forth in 
[rule 4-903], in determining custody. Where no findings are 
made with respect to a particular factor, the Court finds that 
the factor is not significant or weighty in this case." 
"Although the court considers many factors, each is not on 
equal footing. Generally, it is within the trial court's 
discretion to determine, based on the facts before it and 
within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a 
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative 
importance and to accord each factor its appropriate weight." 
XVI! 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, ^ 26, 
989 P.2d 491. Given the nearly equal parenting time enjoyed by the 
parties over the child's life and expert testimony establishing 
that the parties were equally involved in raising the child, we 
agree with the trial court that, in this case, the factors that 
Huish claims are of pivotal significance — the duration 
of the original physical custody decree and child-parent 
bonding — are not dispositive. 
Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, 191 P.3d 1242 
Before modifying a custody order, the court 
conducts a bifurcated inquiry to determine, first, if there has 
been a substantial and material change in the circumstances upon 
which the award was based, and, if so, whether a modification is 
in the best interests of the child. 
Page 498 
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 
(1998);[fn6] Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v. 
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The required 
finding of changed circumstances promotes the policies of 
preserving stability in the child's relationships and preventing 
the burden on the parties and courts of successive adjudications. 
See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the court generally may 
not consider evidence of the child's best interests until it finds 
changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650-51 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, when a custody order is entered 
pursuant to a stipulated agreement, rather than a prior 
adjudication of the child's best interests, "the res judicata 
policy underlying the changed-circumstances rule is at a 
particularly low ebb." Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603. See id. at 605. 
Tf 23 In this case, the trial court ruled there was a substantial and 
material change of circumstances concerning Jackson, Hudema, and 
Carpenter. The court based this determination on various factual 
findings, including that, subsequent to the original custody 
order, both parents had remarried and moved to new communities 
separated by a distance that prohibited Jackson's daily contact 
with both parents, and Jackson had begun school, making extended 
periods of visitation unworkable during most of the year. In light 
of these facts, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion 
xviii 
in finding changed circumstances. 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UTApp 290, 989P.2d49!9 497-98 
We will uphold a trial court's decision to modify a divorce 
decree if it is within the range of sound discretion.[fnl] See 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). The trial 
court determined that the children should be removed from the 
custody of their mother and placed in their father's custody if 
— but only if— Alicia were to move beyond the boundaries of 
Summit County, Utah.[fn2] The focus of the trial court's analysis 
and decision, then, was not on the parties' respective 
parenting skills.[fn3] Instead, the court's order can only be taken 
to mean that the trial court believed that the children's 
domicile in Summit County is so essential to their well-being 
that removal from that community would be more detrimental to 
them than separating them from their custodial parent — the 
person who has been primarily responsible for their day-to-day 
care for the entirety of their lives. While such a conclusion 
is not inherently impossible, a factor of considerable 
importance in determining the best interest of children is the 
maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children 
from their existing custodial placement 
Page 723 
undercuts that policy.[fn4] See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hirsch, 
725 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Hutchison 
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 
620 P.2d 511, 512 (Utah 1980); In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 
298-99, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (1966); In re Application of Conde, 
10 Utah 2d 25, 29, 347 P.2d 859, 861 (1959); Rosendahl v. 
Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870, 873 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 
478-79 (Utah App. 1991); Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 
App. 1990). Therefore, unless there were compelling evidence 
that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for the 
children than allowing them to continue to reside with their 
life-long primary caregiver, we would conclude that the trial 
court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion in entering the 
order before us. 
Larson v. Larson, 888 P. 2d 719, 722 (Utah App, 1994) 
XIX 
In Larson, this court reversed a trial court's custody modification, concluding 
that allowing children to remain in their life-long community and 
maintain a relationship with their extended family is insufficient 
justification for removing children from the custody of their 
primary caregiver. See id. at 722, 725-26. Notably, in 
Larson there was no evidence of interference with visitation; 
in fact, the custodial parent had ffbeen extremely flexible in 
coordinating [the noncustodial parent's] visitation." 
Id. at 725. This case is therefore distinguishable from 
Larson because the trial court here, as in Sigg, 
"arrange[d] custody in a way that fosters a relationship with both 
parents." See Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917. HANSON v. HANSON, 2009 UT App 
365, 368 
Stevens v. Collard 863 P.2d 534 (Ut. Ct. App.; 1992) 
11) "The former husband's default permitted the trial court to accept the former 
wife's allegations as true, for purposes of establishing the threshold issue of a 
change of circumstances, and (2) the former husband had become unemployed 
and that he had been, by circumstances to move with the child into his Parents' 
home, were sufficient to warrant modification, absent any showing of the effect 
those changes had on the former husband's parenting ability." 
"The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to amend its 
'Order' to the trial court. The Court of Appeals should instruct the trial court to 
take evidence on all four factors: unemployment, Plantiff s move to his 
Parents' home, child visitation, and Plantiff s changed physical circumstances, 
so as to establish whether Plantiff s changed circumstances are legally 
sufficient to reconsider the custody issue. As, so modified, the Court of 
Appeals ruling stands." 
Stevens V. Collard 837 P.2d 593 Utah Court of Appeals 1992 
[8] "A trial court's decision concerning modification of a divorce decree will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Crouse, 817 P.2d 838. 
When, as have, the party seeking modification has failed to establish any 
change that would justify re-examination of the presently existing custody 
arrangement, we hold that modification of that arrangement, constitutes an 
abuse of discretion." 
Conclusion 
xx 
"However, even under the relaxed evidentiary standards are legally insufficient 
to justify re-opening the question of custody." 
Becker v. Becker 694P.2d608 Ut. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1984, (No. 19798)) 
"Accordingly, it is not merely to allege a change which, although otherwise, 
does not exist essentially affect the custodial relationship." Id., 649 P.2d at 54 
"In other words, if the circumstances that have changed do not appear on their 
face to be the kind of circumstances on which the earlier custody decision was 
based, there is no valid reason to reconsider that decision. The rationale is that 
custody placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the 
factual basis for them has completely changed." 
"We do not find that's an abuse of discretion as the evidence does not indicate 
that the custody circumstances of the child or the parenting capabilities of the 
Respondent will be affected by the move." 
"Therefore, in the absence of a material change in circumstances, it is not 
sufficient merely to allege that a child might be better attended in the 
petitioning parents' custody." 
Stevens v. Collard 837 P.2d 593 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). 
[4] "A party must show, in addition, to the existence and extent of the change, 
that the change is significant in relation to the modification sought. The 
asserted change must, therefore, have some maternal relationship to and 
substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the presently 
existing custodial relationship.. .Accordingly, it is not merely to allege a change 
which, although, otherwise substantial, does not affect the custodial 
relationship." 
"This case was remanded from the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of appeals 
and asserted the Court of appeals decision." 
"Disproved Watkins v. Nelson 163 NJ. 235, 748 A.2.d 558 (779 P.2d 1195, 
1197 (Alaska 1989). Requiring unfitness or that parental custody would be 
clearly detrimental to the child. 
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38, 41 (Ut. Ct. App. 1982) 
XXI 
"Requiring that unfitness or that no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent 
has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and 
welfare for the childs,' and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and 
understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents' generally." 
Dunkin v. Hinich, 44 Z.N. W.2d 148, 153 (Min. 1989) 
"(Noting presumption exists, unless parent is unfit, or "grave and weighty" 
reasons exist that custody otherwise would not be in the best welfare and 
interest of the child.)" 
Stanley v. Deborah., 124 KH. 138, 467 A.2d 249, 251 (1983) 
"Recognizing parental presumption, but making ultimate determination depend 
on child's best interests." 
Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. 2000) 
(Same) 
In Re: Kasmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo. 1970) 
"Recognizing unfitness of best interest of child, but number 252 in proceedings 
including children of tender years it is only in very exceptional circumstances 
that a Mother should be deprived of the care and custody of her children." 
"One overwhelming majority of states do not apply simply the child's best 
interests standard, or the ubiquitous, amorphous standard, urged by the 
dissenters, if fear "that is taken to its logical conclusion," application of {that} 
standard 'could lead to a redistribution of the entire minor population among 
the worthier members of the community." 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1991 Ut. Ct. App. 290, y, 989P.2d491 
"Mother, who had sole physical custody of child with shared joint legal with 
father, moved to increase child support after father moved to another city to 
accept new job at higher salary. Father moved to modify custody based on 
changed circumstances. The Second District Court awarded sole physical 
custody father with structured visitation." 
"Trial Court did not err in ruling that there was a sufficient change of 
circumstances to warrant a modification of custody. (3)The trial court abused 
its discretion in determining that religious compatibility and comparison of 
moral character favored awarding custody to Father. (4)It was the court's 
discretion to rule that child's interests were best served by awarding custody to 
XXII 
father because child's strong bond with his father and the increased kinship ties 
near father's home." 
Davis v. Davis 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) 
f l"At the time of divorce the parties had been married nearly 13 years and had 
one child, JZ. 
[^2" At the hearing, the parties agreed that James would have custody of JZ. So 
the child could remain in the family home." 
'The Supreme Court stated that in a custody dispute between fit parents, 
"considerable weight" should be given to the identity of the primary caretaker. 
Id at 648. 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Ut. Ct. App. 1986) 
"Identity of parent with whom child has spent most time pending divorce is 
factor to consider in custody decision. Here, because the trial court specifically 
found that neither parent has been Drew's primary caretaker during the 
pendency of the divorce, and because the balance of factors did not otherwise 
tip in favor of the custodial status quo, the holdings in Davis and Praysek are 
inapplicable." 
Childs v. Childs 967 P. 2d 942, 945 (Ut. Ct. app. 1998) cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 
(Ut. Ct. App 1994) 
\ 1 "(4)Award of $1000 to mother for attorney's fees was not unreasonable." 
Childs v. Childs 967 P.2d 967 P.2d 942 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998) 
f l"Brad and Heather were married and had three children. [^3A custody 
evaluation recommended joint legal custody, but suggested Brad not be 
awarded primary physical custody, 944, of all three children. fBrad's desire for 
custody has been continual and deep in that he adjusted his work schedule so he 
could be available for the children. Moreover, Brad has maintained regular 
employment and is better able to provide for the children and, with assistance 
from his extended family, can provide quality personal; and surrogate care for 
his children." 
Huish v. Monroe 191 P.3d 1242 (Ui. Ct. App., 2008) 
Opinion 
"Huish assigns fifteen errors, which for convienience we restate as four: (1) 
that her due process rights were violated, (2) that res judicata and issue 
preclusion bar the parties' from relitigating custody, (3) tha the trial court erred 
in allowing a witness to testify about the best interests' of the child without first 
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explicitly determining whether there existed a substantial change in 
circumstances warranting a material change in custody; and (4) that the trial 
court's 'Findings of Fact' are unsupported by the evidence and its legal 
conclusions are erroneous." 
u(5)Trial court could hear evidence of changed circumstances and the childs' 
best interests simultaneously provided that it kept its analysis appropriately 
bifurcated; and (6)Factors of duration of original physical custody decree and 
child-Parent bonding were not dispositive." 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 
"Huish's case in chief (citation omitted). [2][2]^l"The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner." 
U.S. S Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed.2d 18 (1976) 
"In the context of parental right, '[Due process requires that as parent be given a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard by submitting testimony herself and bny 
witnesses." In re: S.H, 2007 (Ut. Ct. App. 8, f 21, 155 P.3d 109 (alteration in 
original)(citation omitted). 
Paryzek v. Prayzak 776 P.2d 78, *82 
"[In considering competing claims between to custody between fit parents 
under the best interests of the child 'standard/ considerable weight should be 
given to which parent has been the childs' "primary caretaker" prior to divorce. 
Davis 749 P.2d 648 (emphasis added) [4][5]. }^4, Sentence 4. Therefore, 
insofar as the trial court in this case failed to factor in Martins need for stability 
and his two and one-half years' in Vladimir's custody prior to trial in its 
determination of Martin's best interests, the court erred."* 83Furthure in 
reviewing the trial court's actions, "[W]e will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court" //substantial evidence supports the factual findings and 
there was a proper application of the legal standards. Bake v. Bake 772 P.2d 
461 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
Kramer v. Kramer 738 P. 2d 624 
"Initial custody was based on the best interests of the children, Utah Code anno. 
§ 30-3-10(1984). Custody changes must also be made on the same basis, § 30-
3-5. 
Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51, 55 (Construing § 30-3-5) 
VYIV/ 
"...but a legal Judge in a change of custody proceeding must necessarily take 
into account, in determining the best interests' of the child that proposition that 
a child chould not be uprooted from an established well-functioning 
relationship, except for strong and good reasons." 
738 P. 2d 624, *628 
(last paragraph) 
"Focusing only on the alleged change of circumstances of one or the other of 
the parents may result in great harm to the child. Second and more important, 
the requirement is intended to ensure sufficient stability in children's lives to 
enable them to develop relationships and a sense of familiarity with their 
surroundings that enhance their sense of security and self-identity, enabling 
them to find appropriate role models after which to pattern their lives and to 
develop the ability to give and receive love, a necessary requirement for 
achieving potential as human beings." 
738P.2d624, *627 
FN3."Of course, even if the decree was essentially conditional and a change in 
the non-custodial parents' circumstances does justify re-opning of the custody 
question, events during the intervening custody period may have solidified the 
childs' relationship with the custodial parent, that the second prong of the 
Hogge test cannot be satisfied. "It is entirely proper, in applying the second 
prong of Hogge to consider the events and developments which have occurred 
in the intervening period of time and "to determine de novo which custody 
arrangement will serve the welfare or best interests of the child." Hogge v. 
Hogge 649 P.2d at 54. This includes, of course, "the advantage of stability in 
custody arrangements that will always weigh against changes in the party 
awarded custody." Id. See Moody v. Moody 715 P.2d at 510 N.l. 
Fontenot v. Fontenot 714 P.2d 1131 
"Although both children enjoyed positive a relationship with each parent, the 
bond between the children and their Mother was stronger. The court appointed 
expert who evaluated the child custody verified that although both parties' were 
capable and loving parents, the plantiff had functioned in the role of primary 
parent and security figure to the children. Warm emotional ties between 
children and Mother had bonded and were very important to the childrens 
physical and emotional well-being." 714 P2.d 1131, *1133. 
FN3 Shiugi v. Shiugi, Supra. 
xxv 
Although, the conduct of both parents has been less than exemplary, there is 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that the interests 
of the children are best served by maintaining their strong bond with the 
Plaintiff. By awarding custody to the Mother, both parents are able to maintain 
and strengthen their relationships with the children. An award of custody to the 
Defendant would result in the disruption of the present close and special 
relationship between the Mother and the children. See Hafen 'The 
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the 
Individual and Social Interests 81, Mich, Rev. 463. 
Hogge v. Hogge 649 P. 2d at 53-54 
FNl "The "Change of Circumstances" threshold is high to discourage frequent 
petition for modification of custody decrees. The test was designed to "Protect 
the custodial parent from harassment by repeated litigation and [to] protect the 
child from 'ping-pong' custody awards." Id. " 
'The rational is that custody placements, once made, should be as stable as 
possible unless the factual basis for them has completely changed." 
"The trial court was also particularly mindful of the unique role usually played 
by the Mother in caring for her children in tender years.' Boels v. Boels (Ut. 
CtApp. 1191(1983). 
"Principles of res judicata applies to custody modification proceedings." 
Connellv. Cornell—P.3d—9 2010 WL 2105190 (Ut Ct App.., 2010) 
"The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law." 
"The Court of Appeals reviews a trial courts' decision regarding attorney fees 
in a divorce proceeding for an abuse of discretion." 
"A trial courts failure to provide adequate factual findings as to husbands' 
needs, earning capacity, and ability to pay alimony, in support of alimony 
award, during divorce proceeding, the trial court found that husband had a 
monthly income of $5996, a monthly rent of $752, monthly living expenses for 
himself and second wife of $1500, child care costs of $380 per month, the court 
referenced husband's declaration, and it attempted to estimate husbands' net 
monthy income to the penny after subtracting all expenses. West's UCA § 30-
3-5/ 
"A trial court's failure to provide adequate findings regarding the statutory 
factors for determining alimony is reversible error when the facts that logically 
support the findings are not clear from the record. West's 30-3-35" 
UCA § 30-3-5 (8)(g)(iii)(A) 
"Remand for reconsideration of attorney's fees award to wife was warranted in 
divorce proceeding: if the trial court in its discretion ordered payment of 
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reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to statutory subsection governing the 
establishment of orders, its order should be supported by findings related to 
wifes' need and husband's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees, 
whereas, if the trial court in its discretion ordered payment of reasonable 
attorney fees pursuant to statutory subsection governing enforcement orders, its 
order should be supported by a finding that wife substantially prevailed on the 
motions for which she sought attorney fees. West's UCA § 30-3-3. 
"A court may impute income to an underemployed spouse for purposes of 
calculating alimony." 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." 
Remand was required to allow the trial court to rul of wifes' claim for 
retroactive child support for the period October 2001, the date the 
parties'permanently separated to April 2002. The date husband's support 
obligations began pursuant to the court's order, where the wife raised the issue 
in her complaint for divorce, the court ordered husband's child support 
obligation to begin April 2002 and stated that wife "reserves the right to argue 
retroactivity of support," and wife adduced evidence of the trial regarding 
husband's failure to pay any support during that time period." 
*2[5] ^f7"Third, wife's contends that the trial court erred by denying retroactive 
child support and nanny care costs. We review a trial courts' child support 
order for an abuse of discretion. See Hill v. Hill 841 P2d 722, 724 (Ut Ct. App. 
1992). 
"If a trial court considers these factors in setting an award of alimony (child 
support, we will not disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious 
equity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Bakanowski, 
2003 Ut. Ct. App. 357 f 10, 80 P.3d 153 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Wife contends that the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings 
regarding the third mandatory factor set forth in UCA § 30-3-5, Husband's 
ability to provide support. See UCA § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii). 
"In addition, an adequate analysis of the factor regarding ability to pay "must 
do more than simply state the payor spouses income." Young v. Young 2009 
Ut Ct. App. 3 f 19, 201 P.3d 301 (Citation omitted) (Cert, denied 211 P.3d 986 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2009). Wife contends that the trial court erred by failing to 
enforce its own prior ruling that would have barred husband from claiming the 
second wife was unable to work and contribute to his living expenses. 
"Remand was required to allow the trial court to reconsider wife's request for 
reimbursement of one-half of the child care costs she incurred for years before 
all children were in school full-time, proceeding when the trial court relied 
XXVII 
primarily on the ages and corresponding needs of the children at the time the 
court issued its decree, when all the children were in school full-time, but wife's 
request covered the years of 2003-06, and, in 2003, the parties' youngest 
children were two and four year's old West's UCA § 78B-12-214(1). While 
the Court of Appeals affords the trial court broad discretion in fashioning 
support awards, its findings of fact must show that the court's Judgment of 
decree follows logically from, and is supported by the evidence." 
Utah Court of Appeals § 788-12-102(7) (Supp.2009) 
Conclusion 
f 48 "However, the trial court erred in applying a unitary analysis to attorney 
fees incurred in establishing court orders and attorney fees incurred in enforcing 
court orders." 
Hill v. Hill 841 P. 2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992) 
"Child support order will not be disturbed unless their has been an abuse of 
discretion; however, failure of trial court to consider and make findings on 
statutorily mandated factors is itself a n abuse of discretion. Failure to consider 
statutory guidelines when ruling on father's motion for downward modification 
of child support obligation was reversible error. UCA 1953, § 78-45-7, 19. We 
therefore, reverse the modification of child support and remand for calculation 
pursuant to the guidlelines or for findings that justify deviation from them. 
UCA § 78-45-7 
Doyle v. Doyle 221 P. 2d 888 (Ut Ct. App. May 2010) 
"Determination of a trial court in a proceeding to modify child custody that 
there has or has not been substantial change in circumstances is presumed valid, 
and an appellate court reviews the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard." 
West's UCA §30-3-10.4. 
"An appellate court reviews a trial courts' legal determinations regarding a 
parents' entitlement to child support modification for correctness. West's UCA 
§78B-12-10(8)(l),and78B-12-301. 
"An argument is inadequately briefed, and thus an appellate court will decline 
to consider it, if it wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support it." 
"Law of the case does not go so far to prohibit a judge from catching a mistake 
and fixing it." 
